Abstract
Introduction
Resource management in Grid systems [5, 9] is challenging due to: (a) geographical distribution of resources, (b) resource heterogeneity, (c) autonomously administered Grid domains having their own resource policies and practices, and (d) Grid domains using different access and cost models.
In previous generation distributed computing environments (DCEs), resource management systems (RMSs) were primarily responsible for allocating resources for tasks. They also performed functions such as resource discovery and monitoring that supported their primary role. In Grid systems, with distributed ownership for the resources and tasks, it is important to consider quality of service (QoS) and security while allocating resources. Integration of QoS into RMS has been examined by several researchers [7, 11] . However, security is implemented as a separate subsystem of the Grid [6] and the RMS makes the allocation decisions oblivious of the security implications.
Our study on integrating trust into resource management algorithms is motivated by the following scenarios. Grid computing systems provide a facility that enable large-scale controlled sharing and interoperation among resources that are distributively owned and managed. Trust is a major concern of the consumers and producers of services that participate on a Grid. Some resource consumers may not want their applications mapped onto resources that are owned and/or managed by entities they do not trust. Similar concerns apply from the resource producer side as well. Current generation of distributed systems addresses these concerns by providing security at different levels. Suppose resource Å is allocated task Ì . Resource Å can employ sandboxing techniques to prevent task Ì from eavesdropping or interfering with other computation or activities ongoing on Å. Similarly, task Ì may employ encryption, data hiding, intelligent data encoding, or other mechanisms to prevent Å from snooping into the sensitive information carried by task Ì .
Based on the above scenarios we hypothesize that if the RMS is aware of the security requirements of the resources and tasks it can perform the allocations such that the security overhead is minimized. This is the goal of the trustaware resource management system (TRMS) studied here. The TRMS achieves this goal by allocating resources considering a trust relationship between the resource provider (RP) and the resource consumer (RC). If an RMS maps a resource request strictly according to the trust, then there can be a severe load imbalance in a large-scale wide area system such as the Grid. On the other hand, considering just the load balance or resource-task affinities, as in existing RMSs, causes inefficient overall operation due to the introduction of the overhead caused by enforcing the required level of security. Mapping according to load balance or trust considerations results in diverging schedules. The former spreads the requests for the sake of load balance while the latter segregates them for security considerations. In the TRMS algorithms examined here, the minimization criterion is derived from load balancing and security considerations. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2, defines the notions of trust and reputation and outlines mechanisms for computing them. A trust model for Grid systems is presented in Section 3. Trust-aware resource management algorithms are presented in Section 4. The performance and 1 the analysis of the proposed algorithms are examined in Section 5. Related work is briefly discussed in Section 6.
Trust and Reputation

Definition of Trust and Reputation
The notion of trust is a complex subject relating to a firm belief in attributes such as reliability, honesty, and competence of the trusted entity. There is a lack of consensus in the literature on the definition of trust and on what constitutes trust management [12, 8, 1] . The definition of trust that we will use in this paper is as follows:
Trust is the firm belief in the competence of an entity to act as expected such that this firm belief is not a fixed value associated with the entity but rather it is subject to the entity's behavior and applies only within a specific context at a given time.
That is, the firm belief is a dynamic value and spans over a set of values ranging from very trustworthy to very untrustworthy. The trust level (TL) is built on past experiences and is given for a specific context. For example, entity Ý might trust entity Ü to use its storage resources but not to execute programs using these resources. The TL is specified for a given time frame because the TL today between two entities is not necessarily the same TL a year ago.
When making trust-based decisions, entities can rely on others for information pertaining to a specific entity. For example, if entity Ü wants to make a decision of whether to have a transaction with entity Ý, which is unknown to Ü, Ü can rely on the reputation of Ý. The definition of reputation that we will use in this paper is as follows:
The reputation of an entity is an expectation of its behavior based on other entities' observations or the collective information about the entity's past behavior within a specific context at a given time.
Computing Trust and Reputation
In computing trust and reputation, several issues have to be considered. First, the trust decays with time. For example, if Ü trusts Ý at level Ô based on past experience five years ago, the trust level today is very likely to be lower unless they have interacted since then. Similar time-based decay also applies for reputation. Second, entities may form alliances and as a result would tend to trust their allies more than they would trust others. Finally, the TL that Ü holds about Ý is based on Ü's direct relationship with Ý as well as the reputation of Ý, i.e., the trust model should compute the eventual trust based on a combination of direct trust and reputation and should be able to weigh the two components differently.
Let Ü and Ý denote two entities. The trust relationship for a specific context at a given time Ø between the two entities, expressed as ´Ü Ý Ø µ, is computed based on the direct relationship for the context at time Ø between Ü and Ý, expressed as ¢´Ü Ý Ø µ, as well as the reputation of Ý for context at time Ø expressed as ª´Ý Ø µ. Let the weights given to direct and reputation relationships be « and ¬, respectively. The trust relationship is a function of direct trust and reputation. If the "trustworthiness" of Ý, as far as Ü is concerned, is based more on direct relationship with Ü than the reputation of Ý, « will be larger than ¬.
The direct relationship is computed as a product of the TL in the direct-trust Currently, we are developing a trust management architecture that can evolve and maintain the trust values based on the concepts explained above. The rest of this paper is concerned with using the trust values maintained by such a system to perform efficient resource allocation.
A Trust Model for Grid Systems
Trust Model for Grid Systems
In our model, the overall Grid system is divided into Grid domains (GDs). The GDs are autonomous administrative entities consisting of a set of resources and clients managed by a single administrative authority. By organizing a Grid as a collection of GDs, issues such as scalability, site autonomy, and heterogeneity can be easily addressed. In our model, we associate two virtual domains with each GD: (a) a resource domain (RD) to signify the resources within the GD and (b) a client domain (CD) to signify the clients within the GD. As RDs and CDs are virtual domains mapped onto GDs, some instances of RDs and CDs can map onto the same GD.
An RD has the following attributes that are relevant to the TRMS: (a) ownership, (b) set of type of activity (ToA) it supports, and (c) trust level (TL) for each ToA. The set of ToAs determine the functionalities provided by the resources that are part of the RD. Some example activities a task can engage at an RD include printing, storing data, and using display services. Associating a TL with each ToA provides the flexibility to selectively open services to clients.
Similarly, the CDs have their own trust attributes relevant to the TRMS. The CD trust attributes include: (a) ownership, (b) ToAs sought, and (c) TLs associated with ToAs. The ToA field indicates the type and number of activities a client is requesting. The ToAs can be atomic or composed. A client with an atomic ToA requires just one activity whereas a client with a composed ToA requires multiple activities.
A trust level 
has a value that is not provided by ÇÌÄ. This is supported in the model so that client or resource domains can enforce enhanced security by increasing their RTL value to . A straight forward approach to creating and maintaining the trust level table can result in an inefficient process in a very large-scale system such as the Grid. This process is made efficient in our model by various methods. First, as mentioned previously, we divide the Grid system into GDs. The resources and clients within a GD inherit the parameters associated with the RD and CD that are associated with the GD. This increases the scalability of the overall approach. Second, trust is a slow varying attribute, therefore, the update overhead associated with the trust level 
Trust-Aware Resource Management Algorithms
Overview
In this section, we present three trust-aware resource management (TRM) algorithms as example applications of integrating trust into the RMS where clients belonging to different CDs present the requests for task executions and the TRM algorithms allocate the resources. Different requests belonging to the same CD may be mapped onto different RDs. The TRM algorithms presented here are based on the following assumptions: (a) scheduler is organized centrally, (b) tasks are mapped non-preemptively, and (c) tasks are indivisible (i.e., a task cannot be distributed over multiple machines). For the on-line mode mapping heuristic, the TRM schedules client requests as they arrive. This scheduling is done by the TRM-scheduler algorithm based on the MCT on-line mapping heuristic. For the batch mode mapping heuristics, the TRM collects client requests for a predefined time interval to form batch of requests, called a meta-request. The TRM-scheduler algorithm schedules the meta-request based on the two batch heuristics namely trust-aware Min-min, and trust-aware Sufferage heuristics.
Let Ø´Ö µ denote the task being executed by request Ö and ´Ö µ denote the originating client. Furthermore, let Ê be the Ø meta-request and « be the available time of machine Å after executing all requests assigned to it. Further, « be the available time « after executing all requests that belong to meta-request Ê . Also, let EEC(Å ǾÖ µ) be the expected execution cost for Ø´Ö µ on machine Å and ESC(Å ǾÖ µ) be the expected security cost if Ø´Ö µ is assigned to machine Å . The ESC value is a function of the trust cost (TC) value obtained from ETS (Table 1 ) and the task under consideration. When the RMS is considering the trust notion while allocating resources, the following equation is used to calculate the ESC Finally, let ECC(Å ǾÖ µ) denotes the expected completion cost of Ø´Ö µ on machine Å which is computed as the EEC of Ø´Ö µ on machine Å plus the ESC of Ø´Ö µ on machine Å . The goal of TRM algorithm is to assign Ê
where Ò is the number of requests and Ñ is the number of machines.
The Trust-Aware Minimum Completion Time Algorithm: The MCT heuristic [10] assigns each task to the machine that results in that task's earliest completion time. This causes some tasks to be assigned to machines that do not have the minimum execution time for them. As a task arrives, all the machines are examined to determine the machine that gives the earliest completion time for the task.
The trust-aware MCT algorithm starts by computing the ESC in terms of the trust cost which is the difference between the ´Ö µ requested TL and the offered TL by a machine Å in Ê . The trust cost is an indicator of how well is the trust relationship between an RD and a CD. For example, if the trust cost is 0, then the two parties completely trust each other. After that, the ECC table is initialized and the request Ö is assigned to the machine with the lowest completion cost. The task Ø´Ö µ that was successfully assigned to machine Å is used to update machine Å available time « which in turn is used to compute or update the expected completion cost for all requests yet to be assigned to machime Å .
The Trust-Aware Min-min Algorithm:
The TRM-scheduler algorithm schedules a batch of requests called meta-request. To map the meta-requests, we introduce a heuristic based on [10] called the trust-aware Min-min heuristic. Min-min begins by scheduling the tasks that change the expected machine available time by the least amount.
The initialization phase of he trust-aware Min-min algorithm is similar to the ones in the MCT heuristic. The request scheduled on machine Å is deleted from the metarequest Ê Ú . The task Ø´Ö µ that was successfully assigned 
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to machine Å is used to update machine Å available time « which in turn is used to compute or update the expected completion cost for all requests yet to be assigned to machime Å .
The Trust-Aware Sufferage Algorithm:
The TRM-scheduler algorithm schedules a batch of requests called meta-request based on [10] called the trust aware Sufferage heuristic. The Sufferage heuristic is based on the idea that better mappings can be generated by assigning a machine to a task that would "suffer" most in terms of expected completion time if that particular machine is not assigned to it.
The initialization of the trust-aware Sufferage algorithm is similar to the Min-min heuristic. However, for each iteration, the algorithm picks an arbitrary request Ö from the meta-request and aasigns it to a machine Ñ that gives the earliest completion cost for request Ö . If however there was another request Ö that was assigned to machine Ñ previously, the algoeithm chooses the request (among Ö and Ö ) that suffers the most if not assigned to machine Ñ . It shoud be noted that the unchosen request (among Ö and Ö ) will not be considered again for execution until the next iteration.
Performance Evaluation
Evaluation of Security Overheads
We conducted a study to examine the overhead of securing data transmissions for 100 Mbps and 1000 Mbps networks. The machines used were base on an Intel Pentium III processor running at 866 MHz with memory size of ¾ MB and a level 2 cache of size ¾ KB. Tables 2   and 3 show the security overhead for secure transmissions using secure copy (scp) versus the regular transmission using remote copy (rcp) for different network speeds and with different file sizes. As illustrated in Tables 2 through 3 , using scp introduces an overhead caused by the addition of security to the file transfer.
From Table 3 , we observe that the security overhead negates the benefits of using the high speed network. Also, the security overhead as shown in Table 3 is significant for the secure transmission when compared to the regular transmission using rcp.
Furthermore, a performance study was done in [4] where three target benchmark applications are processed by Minimal i386 Software Fault Isolation Tool (MiSFIT) [13] and Security Automata SFI Implementation (SASI x86SFI) [4] sandboxing systems. Software fault isolation (SFI) is a sandboxing technique for transforming code written in unsafe language into safe compiled code. MiSFIT specializes the SFI technique to transform C++ code into safe binary code whereas SASI x86SFI specializes SFI to transform x86 assembly language output of the GNU gcc C compiler to safe binary code. The three target applications used are: (a) a memory intensive application benchmark called pageeviction hotlist, (b) logical log-structured disk, and (c) a command line message digest utility called MD5.
Page-eviction hotlist has the highest runtime overhead of ½¿ ± on MiSFIT and ¾ ± on SASI x86SFI compared to the execution of the target applications on the target systems with no sandboxing. The other two benchmark applications performed as follows (compared to their execution on the target systems with no sandboxing): the logical log-structured disk has runtime overhead of ± on MiSFIT and ± on SASI x86SFI, whereas MD5 has runtime overhead of ¿¿± on MiSFIT and ¿ ± on SASI x86SFI. The additional overhead caused by techniques such as sandboxing may negate the performance advantages gained by the Grid computing and hence we contend that it is essential for the scheduler to consider the security implications while performing resource allocations.
Analysis of the Trust-Aware Schemes
The goal of the three mapping heuristics (MCT, Minmin, and Sufferage) is to minimize the makespan, where makespan is defined as the maximum among the available times of all machines after they complete the tasks assigned to them. Initially « Ñ ¼ Ñ . The scheduler assigns request Ö Ò to machine Å Ñ such that the scheduling criterion is minimized. The heuristics considered in this paper use makespan minimization as their scheduling criterion. 
A given scheduling heuristic computes a value of Ñ such that the makespan is minimized. It should be noted that due to the non-optimality of the heuristics, the makespan value may not be the globally minimal one. Theorem: The makespan obtained a trust-aware scheduler is always less than or equal to the makespan obtained by the trust-unaware scheduler that uses the same assignment heuristic. Proof: Let the makespan obtained by the trust-aware heuristic be: 
Evaluation of the Trust-Aware Schemes
Simulations were performed to investigate the performance of the trust aware resource management algorithms. The resource allocation process was simulated using a discrete event simulator with the requests arrivals modeled using a Poisson random process. The number of CDs and RDs were randomly generated from [1, 4] . The ToAs required for each request were randomly generated from [1, 4] meaning that each Ø´Ö µ involves at least one ToA but no more than four ToAs. The two RTL values were randomly generated from [1, 6] representing trust levels A to F, respectively. Whereas, the OTL values were randomly generated from [1, 5] representing trust levels A to E, respectively.
In an ECC matrix, the numbers along a row indicate the estimated expected completion cost of the corresponding request on different machines. The average variation along the rows is referred as the machine heterogeneity. Similarly, the numbers along a column of the ECC matrix indicate the estimated expected completion cost of the machine for different requests. The average variation along columns is referred to as task heterogeneity. Two classes of EEC matrices were used in the simulation. The first class is the consistent low task and low machine heterogeneity (LoLo). This class of ECCs model network computing systems that have related machines that are similar in performance. The tasks that are submitted to the system have similar resource requirements as well. The second class is the inconsistent LoLo. In this class, the machines are not related. When not using trust, the idea is to map a task belonging to request Ö to machine Å that gives us the earliest completion time without considering the security overhead. Although the completion time was calculated in terms of the execution time of Ø´Ö µ on Å plus the security overhead of executing Ø´Ö µ on Å , the security overhead is not considered when mapping Ø´Ö µ to Å . For the trust-aware heuristics, the security overhead is considered when mapping as well as when calculating the completion time of executing Ø´Ö µ on Å . Tables 4 and 5 , show the benefit of integrating the trust 
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notion into an MCT-based RMS. Table 4 was run for the inconsistent LoLo heterogeneity with 5 machines. In Table   4 , the completion time was reduced by about ¿ ±. Table 5 was run for the consistent LoLo heterogeneity with 5 machines. In Table 5 , the completion time was reduced by about ¿ ±. Tables 6 and 7 show the benefit of integrating the trust notion into a Minmin-based RMS. Table 6 was run for the inconsistent LoLo heterogeneity with 5 machines. In Table   6 , the completion time was reduced by almost ¾ ±. Table 7 was run for the consistent LoLo heterogeneity with 5 machines. In Table 7 , the completion time was reduced by almost ¾ ±. Tables 8 and 9 show the benefit of integrating the trust notion into a Sufferage-based RMS. Table 8 was run for the inconsistent LoLo heterogeneity with 5 machines. In Table 8 , the completion time was reduced by almost ¼±. Table 9 was run for the consistent LoLo heterogeneity with 5 machines. In Table 9 , the completion time was reduced by almost ¿¿±.
In summary, the simulation results indicate that incorporating trust into resource management heuristics can improve the overall quality of the schedules obtained by the resource allocation process.
Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, no existing literature directly addresses the issues of trust aware resource management. In this section,we examine several papers that examine issues that are peripherally related.
In [6] , a security architecture for a Grid system is designed and implemented in the context of the Globus system. In [6] the security policy focuses on authentication and a framework to implement this policy have been proposed.
A design and implementation of a secure service discovery service (SDS) is presented in [2] . SDS can be used by service providers as well as clients. Service providers use SDS to advertise their services that are available or already running while clients use SDS to discover these services.
A model for supporting trust based on experience and reputation is proposed in [1] . This trust-based model allows entities to decide which other entities are trustworthy and also allows entities to tune their understanding of another entity's recommendations.
A survey of trust in Internet applications is presented in [8] and as part of this work a policy specification lan-guage called Ponder [3] was developed. Ponder can be used to define authorization and security management policies. Ponder is being extended Ponder to allow for more abstract and potentially complex trust relationships between entities across organizational domains.
Conclusions
Resource management is the central part Grid computing system. In a large-scale wide-area system such the Grid, security is a prime concern. One approach is to be conservative and implement techniques such as sandboxing, encryption, and other access control mechanisms on all elements of the Grid. However, the overhead caused by such a design may negate the advantages of Grid computing. This study examines the integration of the notion of "trust" into resource management such that the allocation process is aware of the security implications. In this paper we presented three scheduling heuristics that incorporated the trust notion while scheduling the resource requests. The performance evaluation involved two phases: (a) determining the overhead in securing common operations and (b) performing simulations to evaluate the benefit of incorporating trust in the scheduling heuristics.
The experiments performed to evaluate the overhead of securing remote computation indicate that the overhead is significant and techniques for minimizing such overhead by eliminating redundant application of secure operations can greatly enhance the overall performance.
The simulations performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the modifications indicate that the performance can be improved by about 40%. Several further issues remain to be addressed before the trust notion can be included in practical RMSs. Some of these include techniques for managing and evolving trust in a large-scale distributed system, and mechanisms for determining trust values from ongoing transactions.
